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What’s Inside The Failed IPO Study: Insight Into the DLOM
A reminder to practitioners about complying 
with Ethics Interpretaion 101-3: Nonattest 
Services
Expert witnesses continue to be challenged by 
the Daubert ruling. States vary in their applica­
tions of the ruling. Here's a summary of the 
ruling's impact on states, along with a list of 
resources for dealing with Daubert challenges, 
as well as brief summaries of cases that have 
been called "sons of Daubert."
 Some states reject the Daubert ruling and 
continue to use the Frye ruling to determine 
the reliability of an expert's testimony. A few 
more states use a combination of both rulings. 
Here's a summary of the Frye ruling.
A practitioner shares his own experience to 
tell expert witnesses some pitfalls to avoid.
By Gregg S. Gaffen, CFA, ASA
Should some level of discount for lack of marketability be applied in the valuation of a controlling 
ownership block of stock in a closely held company?
Today's CPAs routinely work on a variety of projects for clients in both the public and private 
sectors. These projects often require CPAs to research and use pertinent marketplace data. 
Although financial and other information is abundantly available regarding the public marketplace, 
meaningful information regarding the private marketplace is more difficult to obtain. This article 
provides some insight for CPAs involved in analyzing private companies, particularly related to 
initial public offering (IPO) activity.
"Valuation analysts regularly look to public stock market pricing and rates of return when valuing 
shares of closely held companies."1 When doing so, valuation analysts must consider and adjust for 
one of the primary valuation differences between the shares of a closely held company and those of 
a company with an established public market—the ready marketability of the publicly traded shares.
Valuing a Business: The Analysis and Appraisal of Closely Held Companies, defines marketability 
as "the ability to quickly convert property to cash at minimal cost."1 All other factors being equal, 
an investment is more valuable if it is easily marketable and, conversely, less valuable if it is not 
easily marketable. The degree of marketability—or liquidity—is often one of the most important 
issues in the valuation of a closely held security.
An IPO creates an active and efficient marketplace for the exchange of common stock that was 
previously closely held. In other words, a successful IPO greatly increases the degree of liquidity 
of the subject common stock.
Valuation analysts often (and unconsciously) fail to apply a discount for lack of marketability 
(DLOM) when valuing controlling ownership interests in closely held companies. Furthermore, the 
Internal Revenue Service (the "Service") has argued that the application of a DLOM when valuing 
controlling ownership interests in closely held companies is inappropriate. In such cases, the 
Service claims that such controlling ownership interests should be valued as if they were readily 
marketable (or, effectively, publicly traded).
The rationale that is often presented for not applying some level of DLOM in the valuation of control­
ling ownership interests is the hypothesis that a controlling owner can cause the subject company 
to pursue an IPO, thereby creating liquidity for the common stock. To investigate the empirical validi­
ty of this hypothesis, Willamette Management Associates developed its "Failed IPO Study."
AICPA Shannon P. Pratt, Robert F. Reilly, and Robert P. Schweihs, Valuing a Business: The Analysis and Appraisal of Closely
Held Companies, 4th ed. (New York, NY: McGraw-Hill, 2000), p. 913.
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Introduction to the Failed 
IPO Study
The Failed IPO Study examines companies 
that filed an IPO registration with the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
on Form S-1. Primarily, the Failed IPO Study 
compares the number of these companies to 
the number of companies that successfully 
completed their IPO.
The Failed IPO Study, to date, is based on 
quarterly stock market data from 1990 
through 2002. The results of this study can 
be observed on a quarterly, annual, and total 
period basis. Furthermore, the data are com­
piled both by industry classification and on 
an aggregate (all industry) basis.
The key data gathered in the Failed IPO 
Study include:
1. The number of IPO SEC registration 
filings
2. The number of completed IPOs
3. IPO failure rates
4. The elapsed time from the IPO registra­
tion filing date until the date of the 
successful IPO
The Failed IPO Study also analyzes the suc­
cessfully completed IPOs for which the sub­
ject stock is no longer publicly traded. In such 
cases, the study considers the length of the 
time period from the IPO date until the date at 
which the stock was no longer publicly traded 
and the reason that the stock is no longer 
publicly available.
Furthermore, the Failed IPO Study compares 
IPO activity, including the number of IPO SEC 
registration filings and IPO failure rates to 
stock market/merger & acquisition (M&A) 
transaction data. These market data include 
stock market index pricing data and merger 
and acquisition volume.
Intent of the Failed 
IPO Study
Willamette Management Associates devel­
oped the Failed IPO Study in order to gain 
insight into the IPO process and, particularly, 
the likelihood of a closely held company suc­
cessfully completing an IPO. Understanding 
historical IPO failure rates can be useful to the 
analyst valuing the common stock (and partic­
ularly a controlling ownership block of com­
mon stock) of a closely held company.
The Failed IPO Study analyzes IPO data for a 
variety of time periods and industry classifica­
tions. These data classifications should allow 
valuation analysts to use the data that are 
most meaningful to their subject analyses. 
That is, valuation analysts will be able to 
consider timely IPO failure rates and trends 
and focus on IPO data for a specific industry.
Furthermore, the comparison of IPO activity 
to other stock market/M&A transaction data, 
mentioned above, can be used to recognize 
leading IPO activity indicators as well as 
correlations between IPO activity and certain 
market data. This insight can help the valua­
tion analyst form reasonable expectations 
regarding near-term IPO opportunities for the 
subject closely held company.
The Failed IPO Study is primarily intended to 
help the valuation analyst answer the ques­
tion: should some level of DLOM be applied in 
the valuation of a controlling ownership block 
of stock in a closely held company? In other 
words, is there a relative lack of liquidity relat­
ed to a controlling ownership interest in a 
closely held company as compared with 
publicly traded shares? A related question is, 
"What is the probability of a liquidity event 
occurring with regard to the subject closely 
held company?"
Similarly, the Failed IPO Study is intended to 
test the null hypothesis: The controlling owner 
of a closely held corporation can create a liq­
uidity event (i.e., convert stock into cash) by 
implementing an IPO at a certain price, at a 
low transaction cost, and in a relatively short 
time frame.
Study Insights
The following are the summary results, to 
date, of the Failed IPO Study:
• From 1990 through 2002, approximately 
8,100 companies filed IPO registration 
statements with the SEC.
Continued on next page
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• Approximately 1,800, or 23.3 percent, 
of those companies did not complete 
the IPO.2
• The lowest IPO failure rate, by year, 
was 10.0 percent for companies that 
filed registration statements in 1991.
• The highest IPO failure rate, by year, 
was 53.7 percent for companies that 
filed registration statements in 2000.
• The fewest IPO registrations, totaling 
163, were filed in 2001.
• The most IPO registrations, totaling 
1,040, were filed in 1996.
• The agriculture, forestry, and fishing 
industry had the lowest IPO failure rate 
at 5.3 percent. That IPO failure rate is 
based on 19 IPO registrations.
• The construction industry had the 
highest IPO failure rate at 32.5 percent. 
That IPO failure rate is based on 80 
IPO registrations.
Valuing Controlling 
Ownership Interests
The generally accepted business valuation 
approaches are the market approach, the 
income approach, and the asset-based 
approach. Common valuation methods with 
regard to each of these three business valu­
ation approaches are the guideline publicly 
traded company method, the discounted 
cash flow method, and the asset accumula­
tion method, respectively. Of course, these 
business valuation methods are also used in 
the process of valuing the common stock.
The market data typically used in the applica­
tion of these valuation methods lead to com­
mon stock value indications at a level of mar­
ketability similar to that of publicly traded 
stock. This is because these three generally 
accepted business valuation methods rely 
heavily on capital market data (that is, pub­
licly traded stock price or rate of return). As 
such, only the opportunity for the subject 
company to successfully complete an IPO at 
a known, certain price, at a minimal cost, 
and within a short time period would cause 
the value indications from these three valua­
tion methods to appropriately value closely 
held common stock absent the application of 
a DLOM.
The summary results of the Failed IPO 
Study, presented above, clearly illustrate 
that even once a registration is filed with 
the SEC, successful completion of an IPO is 
highly uncertain. The study also indicates 
that even successful IPOs occur, on aver­
age, approximately three months following 
the IPO registration filing date. Lastly, the 
investment banking fees charged for the 
successful completion of an IPO are typically 
7.5 percent of the initial market capitaliza­
tion for the stock. This percentage does not 
include the other professional fees and 
costs incurred during the IPO process.
Therefore, the common stock owners of 
even a successful IPO candidate experience 
the following elements of illiquidity:
1. An uncertain IPO stock price
2. A significant transaction cost
3. A significant time lag to achieve 
amortization.
Other Sources for 
Creating Liquidity
The argument that controlling ownership 
interests in closely held companies should 
be valued as if readily marketable is also 
premised on the availability of other sources 
for creating liquidity. These potential 
sources of investment liquidity primarily 
include an arm's-length, third party sale of 
the subject company and the creation of an 
employee stock ownership plan (ESOP).
However, even the successful sale of a 
closely held company requires the seller to 
incur a substantial amount of effort, time, 
and transaction cost. For example, the 
company's financial statements must be 
brought up to date. The company owners 
(and other management personnel) are dis­
tracted from their regular responsibilities to 
assist in the sale process, such as during 
the prospective buyers' due diligence 
processes. Legal and other professional fees 
(including fees for a business broker) are 
incurred during the sale negotiation process 
and at the time of the transaction closing.
In addition, the seller may encounter unde­
sirable income tax consequences as a result 
of a sale of the closely held company. Or, if 
the selling shareholder is less than a 100 
percent owner, that controlling stockholder 
may encounter dissention from other (non­
selling) shareholders.
Also, the sale of a closely held company 
usually takes at least six months, and it can 
often take more than a year to complete.
The creation of an ESOP although providing 
a favorable income tax consequence for the 
selling stockholders, also involves substan­
tial effort, time, and transaction costs. 
Furthermore, the potential inability of the 
company to obtain the necessary transac­
tion financing, the potential limitations on 
ESOP contributions by the company, and the 
restrictions on qualified ESOP participants 
often limit the opportunity for the sale of a 
closely held corporation to an ESOP.
DLOM for Noncontrolling 
Ownership Interests
The Failed IPO Study can also provide 
insight when valuing noncontrolling owner­
ship interests in closely held companies. 
Some analysts argue that the valuation of 
the closely held common stock of a near- 
term IPO candidate company should reflect 
the potential increased marketability. This 
argument is implemented through the appli­
cation of a significantly lower than normal 
DLOM or no DLOM.
While a noncontrolling owner cannot cause 
an IPO, some analysts argue against a 
DLOM when (1) the controlling owner has 
expressed an interest in an IPO or (2) the 
subject company is simply a strong candi­
date for an IPO.
Continued on next page
2 As some registrations had been "pending" for several years as of the date of our most current data, we considered a registration to be "failed" if it had been more than 18 
months since their filing. Most successful IPOs occur less than a year after filing an IPO registration statement. We believe that our 18-month cut-off period allows ample 
time to complete a successful IPO.
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The current evidence providing empirical 
support for the DLOM for noncontrolling 
ownership interests falls into two categories: 
studies of restricted stock transactions (that 
is, "restricted stock studies") and studies 
of private stock transactions in companies 
that subsequently had an IPO (that is, 
"pre-IPO studies").
The aforementioned studies are based on 
prices of common stock that later became 
either unrestricted and tradable or readily 
marketable as the result of a successful IPO. 
For the restricted stock studies, it was known 
at the time of the transaction that the subject 
common stock would become readily mar­
ketable at some time within the next two 
years. For the pre-IPO studies, at the times of 
the private transactions in the subject com­
mon stocks, the subject companies were 
probably, at least, considering pursuing an 
IPO. As such, any anticipated increases in 
marketability were factored into the private 
transaction prices. Therefore, the discounts 
for lack of marketability calculated from these 
studies set the minimum DLOM that should 
be used for valuing the common stock of a 
closely held company, subject to case specific 
circumstances.
The restricted stock studies are quite consis­
tent in indicating an average DLOM of approx­
imately 30 percent. The pre-IPO studies pro­
vide support for a somewhat higher DLOM of 
approximately 45 percent.
The information derived from the Failed IPO 
Study, combined with empirical evidence from 
the above-mentioned DLOM studies, provide 
the valuation analyst with the data necessary 
to assess the DLOM to apply in valuing a 
noncontrolling ownership interest in a company 
that is likely to pursue an IPO in the near-term.
Furthermore, the overall to date IPO failure 
rate of 23.3 percent, combined with the data 
used in the DLOM studies, refutes the argu­
ment that stock valuations of IPO candidates 
should include a significantly lower than nor­
mal DLOM or not include a DLOM.
Summary and Conclusion
The Failed IPO Study initial results clearly indi­
cate that there is a wide range in (1) the 
annual number of IPO registration filings and 
(2) IPO failure rates, both by year and by 
industry. These variances support the use of 
time-period-based and industry-based analy­
ses when incorporating the Failed IPO Study 
into a DLOM analysis.
The IPO failure rates indicated by the Failed 
IPO Study, along with the price uncertainty, 
transaction costs, and elapsed time required 
for an IPO, invalidate the null hypothesis that 
controlling ownership interests in closely held 
companies should be valued as if readily mar­
ketable (that is, without the application of 
some DLOM).
The price/transaction uncertainty, transaction 
costs, and elapsed timing related to other 
sources of liquidity-creating events also sup­
port the application of some DLOM when 
valuing a controlling ownership interest in a 
closely held company. Furthermore, the IPO 
failure rate combined with the data used in 
the DLOM studies support the application of a 
DLOM of at least those indicated by the stud­
ies when valuing a noncontrolling ownership 
interest in a closely held company.
It should also be noted that the Study esti­
mates failure rates for companies that filed an 
IPO registration with the SEC. Obviously, 
many companies seriously consider, and even 
begin, the process of filing for an IPO but 
never reach the registration step of the 
process. As such, the "failure rate" when 
including all companies that at least consider 
pursuing an IPO is far greater than that when 
including only those companies that actually 
file an IPO registration statement. However, 
measuring this incremental IPO failure rate 
is impractical.
The Willamette Management Associates 
Failed IPO Study is an ongoing process. As 
additional transactional data become available 
over time, additional analysis will be per­
formed. We anticipate that these analyses 
will identify more and longer-term IPO-related 
trends than have been observed to date. We 
will continue to update the Failed IPO Study 
and to present the results of these Failed IPO 
Study updates as they become available. 
—Gregg Gaffen, CFA, ASA, is senior 
manager at Willamette Management 
Associates, Chicago. He can be contacted 
at gsgaffen@willamette.com and 
773-399-4330.
Complying 
with Ethics 
Interpretation 
101-3: Nonattest 
Services
As of December 31, 2004, practitioners 
are required to comply with Ethics 
Interpretation 101-3: Nonattest 
Services. The documentation require­
ment applies to all nonattest services 
in process on or commencing after 
December 31. The documentation 
requirement became effective for new 
engagements on December 31, 2003 
but was deferred until December 31, 
2004. The AICPA has developed addi­
tional resources to help members fully 
understand their professional responsi­
bilities in complying with the new 
rules. These resources include FAQs, 
articles, background documents, and 
other tools and can be accessed at 
www.aicpa.org.
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Daubert Application in the
Fifty States
At the federal level, trial courts and courts of 
appeal broadly apply and interpret four princi­
ples to determine the reliability of an expert's 
scientific theory or technique. The four 
principles are:
1. Testing Can the theory or technique 
be tested?
2. Peer review. Has the theory or technique 
been subject to peer review?
3. Error rates. Are there established stan­
dards to control the use of the technique?
4. General acceptance. Is the technique 
generally accepted in the relevant 
technical community?
These principles, usually referred to as the 
Daubert guidelines, were articulated by the 
U.S. Supreme Court in Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 C. 
Ed. 2d 469 (1993)). Federal trial courts apply 
the guidelines in their gatekeeping function of 
determining the reliability and relevancy of 
expert testimony.
State courts may or may not be influenced 
by the Daubert guidelines. Alan Ratliff, a 
Managing Director with Huron Consulting 
Group (www.huronconsultinggroup.com) 
has classified into five groups states that:
Dealing with Daubert 
Challenges
Here are some resources that can help expert 
witnesses to understand the impact of and how 
to avoid or deal with Daubert challenges:
• "Guidelines for Guarding Against Daubert 
Challenges To Expert Testimony," by Robert 
F. Reilly, CPA/ABV, ASA, CFA, CPA Expert 
(Summer 1999)
• "The Path to Credibility: Preparing to 
Withstand Daubert Challenges," by Rob
• Accept the Daubert principles. Twenty-six 
states either accepted the Supreme 
Court's decision or they already used a 
similar test.
• Are open to Daubert. Four states are 
willing to reconsider the rule they apply 
to scientific testimony in light of the 
Daubert guidelines.
• Reject Daubert. Ten states have rejected 
Daubert, at least temporarily. They prefer 
to follow the guidelines established in 
Frye v. United States (54 App. D. C. 46, 
293 F. 1013 No. 3968 Court of Appeals 
of District of Columbia). See the sidebar 
"The Frye Ruling" on page 6.
• Follow an alternative state standard. 
Seven states follow guidelines based on 
their state code of evidence.
• Modified Daubert. Four states apply a 
combination of Frye or Daubert.
On its Web site, Huron Consulting Group 
provides Ratliff's report, which includes 
a list of states in each category, along with 
a matrix of states in each category, and 
a list of cases for each state. Visit www. 
huronconsultinggroup.com and click on 
"Resource Library" in the upper right of the 
page to access the report. 
Shaff, CPA Expert (Fall 2001).
• "Daubert, its Progeny, and Their Effect on 
Family Law Litigation in State Courts" by 
Stewart W. Gagnon, Fulbright and Jaworski 
LLP, Houston. This article is available on the 
American Association of Matrimonial 
Lawyers Web site at  
Articles/2000-6/GagnonDaubert.htm.
www.aaml.org/
 "Daubert, Disability, and Worklife 
Expectancies," by David S. Gibson, 
Vocational Econometrics, Inc., 
Louisville, Kentucky. Available at 
http://www.vocecon. com/technical/ 
ftp/bibliography/daubwle. PDF.
Sons of Daubert
In the Summer 1999 CPA Expert, Robert 
F. Reilly, CPA/ABV, ASA, CFA, dubbed 
federal court decisions "sons of 
Daubert" in that they expanded on 
the guidelines:
• General Electric Co. v. Joiner (118 S. 
CT.512 139 C.Ed. 2d 208). In this 
case, "the Court concluded that feder­
al courts of appeals must apply an 
abuse-of-discretion standard when 
they review a trial court's decision to 
admit or exclude expert testimony... 
The Supreme Court also concluded 
that whether the specific Daubert fac­
tors are appropriate measures of reli­
ability in a particular case is a matter 
the law grants the trial judge broad 
latitude to determine."
• Frymire-Brinati v. KPMG Peat 
Marwick,3F. 3d 283 (7th Circuit, 
1993). "[The] Court of appeals 
excluded the testimony of a CPA 
valuation expert.... the expert 
used only one valuation method ... 
to value the subject partnership 
interests.... the Court of Appeals 
specifically noted that the CPA valu­
ation expert 'conceded that he did 
not employ the methodology that 
experts in valuation find essential.'"
• Kumho Tire Company Ltd., et al. v. 
Patrick Carmichael et al.,(119 S. 
Ct. 1167 (March 23,1999). "[The] 
Supreme Court clearly ruled that 
the Daubert factors—and the trial 
court's gatekeeping functions 
regarding the admission of expert 
testimony—apply not only to scien­
tific experts, but also to all 'techni­
cal' or 'other specialized' experts."
• Target Market Publishing, Inc. v. 
ADVO, Inc. 136 F.3d.1139, 1998 
U.S. App. Lexis 2412. "The Court of 
Appeals concluded that the Daubert 
factors apply to valuation and 
economic damages testimony."
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The Frye Ruling
As Mr. Ratliff reports (see Daubert Applications in the Fifty States, p. 5), four states follow a "modified Daubert" along 
with the ruling in Frye v. United States (54 App. D. C. 46, 293 F. 1013,No. 3968, Court of Appeals of District of 
Columbia). Ten states have rejected Daubert in favor of Frye, which was decided more than 80 years ago on December 
3, 1923. The Frye opinion is surprisingly brief and is bare of citations.
At issue is the admissibility of an expert witness's testimony. The following is are excerpts from the opinion:
".... In the course of the trial, counsel for defendant offered an expert witness to testify to the result of a decep­
tion test made upon defendant....
"... the theory seems to be that truth is spontaneous, and comes without conscious effort, while the utterance of 
a falsehood requires a conscious effort, which is reflected in the blood pressure. The rise thus produced is easily 
detected and distinguished from the rise produced by mere fear of the examination itself. In the former instance, the 
pressure rises higher than in the latter, and is more pronounced as the examination proceeds, while in the latter 
case, if the subject is telling the truth, the pressure registers highest at the beginning of the examination, and grad­
ually diminishes as the examination proceeds.
"Prior to the trial, defendant was subjected to this deception test, and counsel offered the scientist who conduct­
ed the test as an expert to testify to the results obtained. The offer was objected to by counsel for the government, 
and the court sustained the objection....
"Counsel for defendant, in their able presentation of the novel question involved, correctly state in their brief that no 
cases directly in point have been found. The broad ground, however, upon which they plant their case, is succinctly 
stated in their brief as follows:
'The rule is that the opinions of experts or skilled witnesses are admissible in evidence in those cases in which the 
matter of inquiry is such that inexperienced persons are unlikely to prove capable of forming a correct judgment 
upon it, for the reason that the subject-matter so far partakes of a science, art, or trade as to require a previous 
habit or experience or study in it, in order to acquire a knowledge of it. When the question involved does not lie 
within the range of common experience or common knowledge, but requires special experience or special knowl­
edge, then the opinions of witnesses skilled in that particular science, art, or trade to which the question relates are 
admissible in evidence.'
"Numerous cases are cited in support of this rule. Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line 
between the experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in this twilight zone the evi­
dential force of the principle must be recognized, and while courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony 
deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must 
be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs."
"We think the systolic blood pressure deception test has not yet gained such standing and scientific recognition 
among physiological and psychological authorities as would justify the courts in admitting expert testimony 
deduced from the discovery, development, and experiments thus far made."
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Divorce Court: Three Pitfalls
Experts Should Avoid 
By William Barrett III, CPA
CPA
Nearly half of all recent first marriages 
will end in divorce, according to pro­
jections from the National Center for 
Health Statistics.1 With a 50-50 
chance of divorce facing newlyweds, 
many may eventually need to turn to 
CPAs for expertise. We will be called 
upon more and more to help clients 
navigate through divorce actions, but 
to represent clients fairly, even the 
most seasoned of CPA experts must 
be aware of three divorce court traps: 
valuation of equitable distribution, 
lengthy written reports, and a profes­
sional mindset on the stand.
Equitable Distribution
Larry Diehl does not excite easily. 
The veteran divorce attorney, scholar 
and true Luddite—a fax machine is 
the closest he comes to communica­
tion technology—does however get 
all toasty and tingly when he hears 
a testifying expert utter the word 
"discount."
Diehl, who wrote much of the Code 
of Virginia statutes on divorce, 
has had his hand in many of the 
Commonwealth's biggest divorce 
cases. "When I hear the opposing 
expert opine about discounts for lack 
of marketability or a minority interest, 
it is 'dead-on-arrival' for the other 
side. To me, it is the greatest pitfall 
that an expert can fall into."
The standard of value used in valuing 
entities for marital dissolution varies 
among states. Under Virginia Statute 
§ 20.107.3, the term "fair value" is 
called for in equitable distribution mat­
ters. However, fair value is not 
defined. To many accounting and legal 
practitioners, the first valuation stan­
dard that comes to mind is "fair mar­
ket value." But there is a big differ­
ence in valuing closely held business­
es and professional practices for equi­
table distribution in Virginia.
In Revenue Ruling 59-60, the IRS 
established fair market value (FMV) 
as the standard to use for a hypotheti­
cal "arm's length" sale. FMV uses the 
concept of a free-market transaction 
where a property exchanges hands, 
on a certain date, from a willing seller 
to a willing buyer. Both parties are 
under no compulsion to transact and 
each has knowledge of all relevant 
facts. Therefore the value established 
reflects the labors of the seller and the 
risks of the new buyer. The risks of 
the buyer are evaluated and then dis­
counted against the seller's value, 
arriving at a fair market value. In other 
words, both the buyer and the seller 
are fairly represented in the final 
transaction price.
In Virginia divorce actions (I say 
Virginia because many states still 
mandate the FMV standard in 
divorce), a newer concept is being 
perfected—the business will not be 
sold. Therefore, another standard 
—intrinsic value—is required to ascer­
tain value as of a certain date. Intrinsic 
value is the value of a business to a 
specific owner based upon the worth 
to husband and wife, and the value to 
the marital partnership that the court is 
dissolving (Code 1950, § 20-107.3, 
subd. A). Intrinsic value is the real 
worth of the business, as distinguished 
from the current market price of a 
business for sale.
The most recent and precedent-set- 
ting case in Virginia is the 1998 
Circuit Court decision and 2000 
Appellate Court affirmation in Howell 
v. Howell. This complex case was 
truly "a classic battle of the experts" 
and hinged on the marital value of the 
husband's partnership interest in a 
large law firm. The husband's expert 
stated that the value was the net of 
his capital account plus his share of 
the firm's net income, discounted for 
minority status, marketability and 
other issues.
The spouse's expert, Virginia CPA Bob 
Raymond, used intrinsic value to 
make his case. He took no discount 
because no sale or transfer of partner­
ship interest was foreseeable, and 
no individual or group within the 
firm exercised majority control. The 
courts agreed.
"In light of Howell, it is reasonable to 
conclude that use of the term 'fair 
value' in Virginia is not as a valuation 
term of art, but as a substitute for the 
term 'intrinsic value."2
The Written Report
Carl Witmeyer is another veteran 
divorce attorney who has also served 
as a commissioner in chancery (a 
court-appointed individual who rules 
on fault issues, and in many Virginia 
jurisdictions rules on equitable distri­
bution). Witmeyer believes form over 
substance in the written report is a 
huge problem.
"When I see that the other side's 
expert has handed in a 50-plus page 
report, I know the trier of fact is going 
to tune out somewhere in that pile," 
Witmeyer said. "Judges want the 
basis and the merits of an expert's 
opinion, yet many experts go off-tar­
get in their written reports and in 
testimony before the judge."
Carl also cites the Howell v. Howell 
case. "Howell was heard before a 
commissioner, a circuit court judge, 
and the judges of the Virginia Court of 
Appeals. The husband's expert had a 
door-stopper-size report. The wife's 
expert had a report that illustrated the
Kreider, Rose M. and Jason M. Fields. "Number, Timing, and Duration of Marriages and Divorces: 1996." U.S. Census Bureau: 2002.
www.census.gov/prod/2002pubs/p70-80.pdf.
Raymond, Robert R., "Valuing Closely Held Businesses for Virginia Equitable Distribution," VAB News Journal, Vol. XXIX, No. 7, 2003.
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issues and methodology to arrive at a marital 
value. Bob [Raymond] stuck with the facts in 
the case and presented them in a manner 
that could be easily reviewed."
Since equitable distribution is so case-spe­
cific in Virginia, the written report, like live 
testimony, takes more than specialized 
expertise to withstand challenge by the 
opposing attorney and experts, and be 
understood and relied upon by the judge. 
Sometimes it comes down to the art of 
the expert intuitively knowing what and 
what not to say in the moment of writing 
and speaking.
As Terry Batzli, a Virginia lawyer who spe­
cializes in divorce valuation litigation, points 
out, "You can be the most knowledgeable 
valuation expert in the world, but if you can­
not communicate properly in this tumultuous 
environment, you will not prevail."
Professionalism
A third pitfall seems to plague the most 
novice and most senior of experts: 
professionalism on the stand.
In one of the first divorce cases I testified in, 
I asked the attorney for her thoughts on my 
testimony. She responded that the testimony 
itself was spot-on. However, she said, "You 
didn't need to be so mean to the other 
attorney. He was just doing his job."
It is a revelation that still haunts me. The 
attorney was essentially saying, "This is not 
about you; it is about how others perceive 
your professional opinion!"
Subjectively, I was "discounting" the value 
of the opposing attorney's questions. At the 
time, I thought the answers I gave were 
straightforward explanations of neutral 
opinion supported by case facts. While the 
explanations may have been, the delivery 
was not.
I picture the judge, silently listening, sea­
soned by years of hearing divorce experts 
testify. He is saying to himself, "Everyone 
else here is just doing his job. But this guy is 
taking it personally."
In the National Association of Certified 
Valuation Analysts' The Valuation Examiner,
John Marcus, a nationally known valuation 
expert, stated, "My [attorney] friend shared 
her frustrations with me. She said that she 
could either find an analyst with integrity and 
no testimony experience, or an 'expert' with 
much courtroom experience and no integrity 
at all."
Note: The author wishes to thank the follow­
ing attorneys for contributing to this article. 
Each is a distinguished member of the 
American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers: 
Lawrence D. Diehl, Attorney at Law, 
Hopewell; Carl J. Witmeyer, II, Witmeyer & 
Allen, PLC, Ashland; and Terrence R. Batzli, 
Barnes & Batzli, PC, Glen Allen.
—William C. Barrett III, CPA CVA, CTP, 
CCFM, of Richmond, can be contacted at 
Bill. Barrett@BarrettPC. com.
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